La vera storia di SONY

The story to pay attention to here is the collusion between big media companies who try to control what we do on our computers and computer-security companies who are supposed to be protecting us.

What do you think of your antivirus company, the one that didn’t notice Sony’s rootkit as it infected half a million computers? And this isn’t one of those lightning-fast internet worms; this one has been spreading since mid-2004. Because it spread through infected CDs, not through internet connections, they didn’t notice? This is exactly the kind of thing we’re paying those companies to detect — especially because the rootkit was phoning home.

What happens when the creators of malware collude with the very companies we hire to protect us from that malware?

Who are the security companies really working for? It’s unlikely that this Sony rootkit is the only example of a media company using this technology. Which security company has engineers looking for the others who might be doing it? And what will they do if they find one? What will they do the next time some multinational company decides that owning your computers is a good idea?

These questions are the real story, and we all deserve answers.

articolo completo di Bruce Schneier

Marcus Ranum e la sicurezza informatica

Una interessante intervista a Marcus Ranum su Securityfocus, che è stata ripresa e citata in molti aspetti. E’ a leggere integralmente, qui mi piace sottolineare un atteggiamento poco enfatizzato, ma molto efficace: la pazienza. Val la pena aspettare finché una tecnologia non è matura? Continua a leggere Marcus Ranum e la sicurezza informatica